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I have advance documents from the White House communications folks and I’m reviewing them now. I’ll update this post as I work my way through the material.

6:36 PM CST: Guiding principles:

Success in Iraq remains critical to our national security and tosuccess in the War on Terror.

Failure in Iraq would have disastrous consequences for the United States, the region, and our allies.

There is no silver bullet solution in Iraq. Every option involves trade-offs across various risks.

Pretty basic stuff – unless you’re a Democrat.

6:40 PM CST: The President is going to assert the war in Iraq’s pivotal role in the greater war on terror:

Winning in Iraq will not end the War on Terror, but it will makesuccess in the War on Terror much easier.

Failing in Iraq would make succeeding in the War on Terror vastly more difficult.

I can’t disagree with that. Critics might say that Iraq wasn’t critical to the greater war effort before the invasion, and there’s room for that arguement, but there’s no denying it’s place, or the price of failure, now.

6:43 PM CST: Iraq and Syria get mentions. That’s good. Well, it’s a start:

Our allies in the region are concerned about negative Iranian influence in Iraq.

Iran has been cultivating influence in Iraq through all means at its disposal.

Syrian actions, while posing less of a strategic threat to Iraq than Iranian actions, exacerbate the tactical challenge faced by the Iraqi government.

I certainly hope we have plans beyond acknowledging the obvious.

6:47 PM CST: The presentation goes on to give a fairly reasonable assessment of the current situation. There’s a half-hearted attempt at positive spin but it acknowledges that choas reigns and Iraq support for the coalition is dropping off due to the worsening security situation.

6:52 PM CST: Key assumptions then and now – Pretty sobering analysis that doesn’t pull any punches. In short, all our assumptions were wrong.

6:54 PM CST: Goals and Objectives. A democratic and self-sustaining Iraq is the goal. The stated timeframe? 12-18 months. The goals in detail:

1. Defeat al-Qaida and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq.
2. Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad andregain control over the capital.
3. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq.
4. Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing the return of the forces of tyranny.
5. Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation but withthe Iraqi Government clearly in the lead.
6. Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.
7. Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy including by helping Iraq maintain and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi development.
8. Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and theinternational community.

7:03 PM CST: Strategic shifts are next. Not much surprise here. There is a greater level of responsibility placed on the Iraqi government:

Iraqis Are in the Lead in Ensuring Success – U.S. in Support Role

  • Place the responsibility for success on the Iraqis
  • Recognize and expect that sectarian violence must be addressed
  • Encourage Iraqis to reach national reconciliation
  • Urge Iraqi Government to serve Iraqis in an impartial way

The remaining items are pretty straightforward. Support moderate forces, enhance security, enhanced civil, political, and economic activities and interestingly:

We Must Maintain and Expand Our Capabilities for the Long War

  • Acknowledge that succeeding in Iraq is the immediate challenge, but it is not the last challenge
  • Ensure we have adequate national capabilities to fight the long war, on the military and civilian side

7:08 PM CST: The way ahead is next and things start to get interesting. In keeping with the new emphasis placed on Iraqi leadership they’ll apparently be developing and leading the Baghdad security plan. That’s an interesting but not exactly confidence inspiring. There is some good news in an admission that the ROE have been restrictive:

Previous: Restrictive ROE hindered execution of Baghdad security plan.

The Way Ahead: Iraqi leaders committed to permissive ROE and non-sectarian, non-political command and control arrangements.

Iran and Syria get mentioned again:

Counter Iranian and Syrian action that threatens Coalition forces.

Interesting but does that translate into meaningful action? I have my doubts.

7:17 PM CST: The report closes with key tactical shifts on both side. The Iraqi shifts focus on support for the rule of law, expansion and enhancement of the security forces, and reform of it’s young government. Our tactical shifts:

  • Increase in U.S. troops; five additional brigades committed to Baghdad.
  • Partnering of U.S. battalions to Iraqi brigades in nine districts of Baghdad
  • Increase U.S. forces available to support Iraqi operations in Anbar, and step up pressure on al-Qaida
  • Remobilize the National Guard to support rotations
  • Expansion of U.S. embed program and partnering
  • Doubling of PRTs and PRT civilian personnel in Iraq
  • Integration of PRTsand BCTs in most areas
  • Request to Congress to support the creation of a Civilian CERP for PRT leaders
  • Jobs creation programs to support operations in Baghdad and Anbar
  • Increase operations against Iranian actors
  • Deployment of security assets to the Gulf region
  • Launch of International Compact, early 2007
  • Increase in end-strength of U.S. Army and Marine Corps
  • Request to Congress to allow State to reimburse civilian agencies that send employees to Iraq

That’s it. I need some time to process the entire thing but my initial thoughts are that it’s a fairly clear and honest assessment of the problems and incorrect assumptions that have dogged this mission. That’s positive. I have strong doubts about the Iraqi government’s ability to lead the way in matters of security. If the government can’t establish itself as an impartial force working for the good of all Iraqis national reconciliation will never materialize. One could even argue that reconciliation is unlikely in even the most optimistic scenarios. That could be the case but we can’t afford not to try.

7:45 PM CST: The presentation is available on the White House website.



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  1. jon purizhansky Says:

    Can’t agree with it more…Winning in Iraq will make winning the war on terror easier and loosing will make it more hard. That’s all!

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